Post by Administrator on Sept 16, 2017 23:05:39 GMT
Karl Victor Clopet and René Malvergne - SS Contessa
Prior to the landings in French Morocco, and after the fall of France in World War II, the U.S. State Department had maintained in French North Africa an unusually large number of very able consular officials. This group was under the leadership of Mr. Robert Murphey, later General Eisenhower's political adviser. From these sources and from the military attache in Tangiers, the U.S. Army obtained much detailed information concerning conditions in Morocco and were placed in contact with loyal Frenchmen who opposed the Vichy regime and were not friendly toward Axis forces.
One Englishman and one Frenchman were smuggled into London, Karl Victor Clopet and René Malvergne. Clopet had an intimate knowledge of the ports, beaches and coast defenses along the entire coast as a result of living in Casablanca for over 12 years and with tight connections to salvage operations there. Malvergne was familiar with every turn and bar in the Sebou river channel, knew all of the shipping which was engaged in the coastal trade, and provided important information concerning pro-Nazi political sentiment which was stronger in the Port Lyautey area than in any other section of Morocco.
It was realized early on that there were not sufficient berths in the port of embarkation to permit all of the Western Task Force to load and embark simultaneously. One Sub Task Force would have to load early, a full week before setting sail. The 60th Regiment and the 1st Battalion Combat Team of the 66th Armored Regiment were well organized and all were as well trained as could have been expected, to include some amphibious training. A commanders conference was held on 14 October in Washington D.C. with Gen. Patton. It was noted that a counter sign for the attack had not been developed yet for identification purposes during operations. Someone suggested the words "George Patton" which met with unanimous approval. The challenger would call "George"; the challenged, if a friend, would answer "Patton". On the night of 15 October, troops and equipment were embarked. Some last minute loading was done on 16 October, and at 13:40 on that day, the sub task force sailed for Solomon's Island in Chesapeake Bay, where they had their rehearsal training.
On the beaches at Solomon's Island, tests of naval gunfire or air support were not allowable, but tests of communications and procedures would be the primary focus. On 17 October, all rehearsal training seemed to be going according to plan. Transports were riding at anchor with landing craft swarming in the water about them. However, at some point, Colonel Demas T. Craw reported from one of the ships that the ship's captain had refused to hang any nets or lower any craft, giving the reason that his crew was not sufficiently trained to go on the expedition. After Gen. Truscott visited with the ship's captain for a while, and informing him that the inadequate state of training and preparation was known, his refusal would have no effect on the overall operation. The captain relented, and training on that ship began. The next day, their voyage to North Africa began.
During the military preparations, another question arose from Naval commanders, how would supplies be carried up the Sebou River to the Port Lyautey airfield? Where was a ship big enough to carry these supplies, and go through a river that might be at most 17 ft (5.2 m) deep? The SS Contessa was the Navy's pick as such a ship. A message was sent to the boat's commander—Capt. William H. John—to go to Newport News to undertake a secret war mission.
The Contessa was a Standard Fruit Company vessel designed for the hauling of bananas and coconuts from Caribbean ports to the U.S. and to be hostess to cruising vacationists. She was drafted for war service in light of the critical ship shortage due to the war. The ships steward was a colorful man who spent his off hours trying to save the souls of the crew and the other half praying for the Contessa's welfare. The boat was nearing the end of her rope, she was salt cracked, rust stained, and her degaussing equipment was gone.
Upon arriving at Newport News, the Contessa went immediately into dry dock for 24 hours for repairs and preparation for her voyage to support the landing at Port Lyautey. By the evening of 18 October, she was completely loaded with gasoline, ammunition and bombs. The naval convoy had set sail already; the Contessa would have to catch up. She was short many crewmen, so the Norfolk city jail was opened up and a crew was made of those seamen who were serving time.
Eventually, the Contessa set sail, and met up with her convoy in the middle of the Atlantic. Her next stop would be at Port Lyautey airfield.
LINK
Prior to the landings in French Morocco, and after the fall of France in World War II, the U.S. State Department had maintained in French North Africa an unusually large number of very able consular officials. This group was under the leadership of Mr. Robert Murphey, later General Eisenhower's political adviser. From these sources and from the military attache in Tangiers, the U.S. Army obtained much detailed information concerning conditions in Morocco and were placed in contact with loyal Frenchmen who opposed the Vichy regime and were not friendly toward Axis forces.
One Englishman and one Frenchman were smuggled into London, Karl Victor Clopet and René Malvergne. Clopet had an intimate knowledge of the ports, beaches and coast defenses along the entire coast as a result of living in Casablanca for over 12 years and with tight connections to salvage operations there. Malvergne was familiar with every turn and bar in the Sebou river channel, knew all of the shipping which was engaged in the coastal trade, and provided important information concerning pro-Nazi political sentiment which was stronger in the Port Lyautey area than in any other section of Morocco.
It was realized early on that there were not sufficient berths in the port of embarkation to permit all of the Western Task Force to load and embark simultaneously. One Sub Task Force would have to load early, a full week before setting sail. The 60th Regiment and the 1st Battalion Combat Team of the 66th Armored Regiment were well organized and all were as well trained as could have been expected, to include some amphibious training. A commanders conference was held on 14 October in Washington D.C. with Gen. Patton. It was noted that a counter sign for the attack had not been developed yet for identification purposes during operations. Someone suggested the words "George Patton" which met with unanimous approval. The challenger would call "George"; the challenged, if a friend, would answer "Patton". On the night of 15 October, troops and equipment were embarked. Some last minute loading was done on 16 October, and at 13:40 on that day, the sub task force sailed for Solomon's Island in Chesapeake Bay, where they had their rehearsal training.
On the beaches at Solomon's Island, tests of naval gunfire or air support were not allowable, but tests of communications and procedures would be the primary focus. On 17 October, all rehearsal training seemed to be going according to plan. Transports were riding at anchor with landing craft swarming in the water about them. However, at some point, Colonel Demas T. Craw reported from one of the ships that the ship's captain had refused to hang any nets or lower any craft, giving the reason that his crew was not sufficiently trained to go on the expedition. After Gen. Truscott visited with the ship's captain for a while, and informing him that the inadequate state of training and preparation was known, his refusal would have no effect on the overall operation. The captain relented, and training on that ship began. The next day, their voyage to North Africa began.
During the military preparations, another question arose from Naval commanders, how would supplies be carried up the Sebou River to the Port Lyautey airfield? Where was a ship big enough to carry these supplies, and go through a river that might be at most 17 ft (5.2 m) deep? The SS Contessa was the Navy's pick as such a ship. A message was sent to the boat's commander—Capt. William H. John—to go to Newport News to undertake a secret war mission.
The Contessa was a Standard Fruit Company vessel designed for the hauling of bananas and coconuts from Caribbean ports to the U.S. and to be hostess to cruising vacationists. She was drafted for war service in light of the critical ship shortage due to the war. The ships steward was a colorful man who spent his off hours trying to save the souls of the crew and the other half praying for the Contessa's welfare. The boat was nearing the end of her rope, she was salt cracked, rust stained, and her degaussing equipment was gone.
Upon arriving at Newport News, the Contessa went immediately into dry dock for 24 hours for repairs and preparation for her voyage to support the landing at Port Lyautey. By the evening of 18 October, she was completely loaded with gasoline, ammunition and bombs. The naval convoy had set sail already; the Contessa would have to catch up. She was short many crewmen, so the Norfolk city jail was opened up and a crew was made of those seamen who were serving time.
Eventually, the Contessa set sail, and met up with her convoy in the middle of the Atlantic. Her next stop would be at Port Lyautey airfield.
LINK